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Neural Emotion Regulation Circuitry Underlying
Anxiolytic Effects of Perceived Control over Pain
Tim V. Salomons1,2, Robin Nusslock3, Allison Detloff1,4,
Tom Johnstone1,2, and Richard J. Davidson1
Abstract
■ Anxiolytic effects of perceived control have been observed
across species. In humans, neuroimaging studies have sug-
gested that perceived control and cognitive reappraisal reduce
negative affect through similar mechanisms. An important lim-
itation of extant neuroimaging studies of perceived control in
terms of directly testing this hypothesis, however, is the use
of within-subject designs, which confound participantsʼ affec-
tive response to controllable and uncontrollable stress. To com-
pare neural and affective responses when participants were
exposed to either uncontrollable or controllable stress, two
groups of participants received an identical series of stressors
(thermal pain stimuli). One group (“controllable”) was led to
believe they had behavioral control over the pain stimuli,
whereas another (“uncontrollable”) believed they had no con-
trol. Controllable pain was associated with decreased state
anxiety, decreased activation in amygdala, and increased activa-
tion in nucleus accumbens. In participants who perceived con-
trol over the pain, reduced state anxiety was associated with
increased functional connectivity between each of these regions
and ventral lateral/ventral medial pFC. The location of pFC
findings is consistent with regions found to be critical for the
anxiolytic effects of perceived control in rodents. Furthermore,
interactions observed between pFC and both amygdala and
nucleus accumbens are remarkably similar to neural mechanisms
of emotion regulation through reappraisal in humans. These
results suggest that perceived control reduces negative affect
through a general mechanism involved in the cognitive regula-
tion of emotion. ■
INTRODUCTION
Perceived control has been defined as “the belief that one
has at oneʼs disposal a response that can influence the aver-
siveness of an event” (Thompson, 1981). A broad scientific
literature has demonstrated the link between perceived
control and mental and physical health. Animals exposed
to uncontrollable stress experience deficits in learning and
motivation as well as increased stress responses compared
with animals exposed to similar amounts of controllable
stress (Weiss et al., 1994; Maier & Seligman, 1976). In hu-
mans, perception of control over life stressors is associated
with reduced levels of depression and disease (Mineka,
1985). Maier and Watkins (1998) have argued that behav-
ioral and neurochemical responses to uncontrollable stress
are particularly relevant for understanding anxiety.
The neural mechanisms by which perceived control
reduces negative emotional responses have been well
delineated at the brainstem level in rodents (Maier &
Watkins, 2005). Recent evidence suggests that, although
brainstem regions are critical, their involvement is depen-
dent on the pFC and, in particular, the ventromedial pFC
(vmPFC; Amat et al., 2005). Functional neuroimaging has
led to advances in our understanding of the role of pFC
in perceived behavioral control (Salomons, Johnstone,
Backonja, Shackman, & Davidson, 2007; Wiech et al.,
2006; Salomons, 2004). Of particular note, the ventro-
lateral pFC (vlPFC) and vmPFC appear to be critically
involved in modulating pain responses based on the per-
ception of control (Salomons et al., 2007; Wiech et al.,
2006). Although these studies have provided a prelimi-
nary understanding of how perceived control alters the
neural response to pain, they were not optimized for
contrasting how a sustained level of perceived control
alters neural and affective responses to repeated expo-
sure to pain. These studies employed within-participant
designs where participants received an equal amount of
controllable and uncontrollable painful stress, such that
the affective responses to controllable and uncontrollable
stress were intermixed. Thus, participantsʼ affective state
reflected mixed success at controlling the painful stressor.
In contrast, previous studies in which participants were
exposed to either only controllable or only uncontrollable
stressors allowed for examination of how a sustained sense
of control might alter the affective state. These studies
evoked a range of behavioral responses in both humans
and animals including deficits in learning and motivation
and, of particular interest to the study at hand, affective
responses resembling anxiety (Maier & Watkins, 1998;
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Weiss et al., 1994; Maier & Seligman, 1976). Although the
neural mechanisms of these effects have been examined
in rodents, they have not been investigated in humans
using in vivo neuroimaging techniques. The goal of this
study was to examine the neural mechanisms through
which sustained levels of perceived control over a stressor
(in this case pain) alters the affective response. Accord-
ingly, we exposed two groups of healthy participants to a
matched set of painful stressors and provided differential
visual feedback such that one group believed they had
behavioral control over the pain stimulus whereas the
other group had the perception of a sustained lack of
control over the pain stimulus.
On the basis of conceptual and anatomical overlap, it
has been suggested (Wiech et al., 2006) that perceived
control may alter the response to stressors through a
mechanism similar to reappraisal (where the meaning
of a stressful event is reinterpreted to alter the emotional
response; Lazarus, 1999; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Neuro-
imaging studies of reappraisal and other forms of voluntary
regulation of negative affect have primarily focused on
the interplay between top–down cortical processing and
bottom–up responses in subcortical regions such as the
amygdala (Kim et al., 2011; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). The
amygdala is differentially activated when individuals have
perceived control over stress (Salomons, 2004). The amyg-
dala has also been implicated in the generation of nega-
tive affective responses (Shin & Liberzon, 2010; Bishop,
2007), making it an ROI for examining how perceived
control alters anxiety. The interaction between amygdala
and vmPFC has been implicated in the regulation of nega-
tive emotion (Kim et al., 2011). Additionally, extensive
evidence points to a role for the vlPFC in regulating activa-
tion in the amygdala when reappraisal is used to down-
regulate negative affect (Kalisch, 2009; Goldin, McRae,
Ramel, & Gross, 2008; Johnstone, van Reekum, Urry, Kalin,
& Davidson, 2007; Ochsner et al., 2004; Ochsner, Bunge,
Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002; Schaefer et al., 2002). A recent
reappraisal study (Wager, Davidson, Hughes, Lindquist, &
Ochsner, 2008) found that downregulation of negative af-
fect was associated with interactions not only between vlPFC
and amygdala but also between vlPFC and the nucleus
accumbens (NAcc) suggesting an additional subcortical
ROI. The potential involvement of the NAcc is consistent
with not only its role in reappraisal but also a proposed
role of the striatum in processing the affectively beneficial
effects of choice and perceived control (Leotti, Iyengar,
& Ochsner, 2010). This proposed role is based on the
demonstrated role of NAcc in reward (Haber & Knutson,
2010) as well as findings that perceived control is inher-
ently rewarding (Leotti & Delgado, 2011).
On the basis of the link between uncontrollable stress,
anxiety, and the neural mechanisms of perceived control
and reappraisal, the primary goals of this study were (1)
to examine how perceived control alters state anxiety in
response to sustained exposure to painful stimuli and
(2) to understand the interaction between subcortical
regions involved in generating affect (amygdala, NAcc)
and cortical regions involved in reappraisal and detection
of control (vlPFC, vmPFC). We predicted that increased
functional connectivity between these cortical and sub-
cortical regions would be associated with anxiety reduction
by perceived control.
An additional objective of this study was to further
investigate the effect of perceived control on the neural
and perceptual response to pain. Previous neuroimaging
studies (Salomons et al., 2007; Wiech et al., 2006; Salomons,
2004) have converged on common regions involved in this
response (e.g., vlPFC, ACC) but have diverged in the condi-
tions that elicit these responses. Similarly controversial are
the effects of perceived control on pain perception, with
some studies finding clear effects of perceived control on
pain perception and others demonstrating null findings
(Arntz & Schmidt, 1989; Thompson, 1981). Thus, although
the primary focus of this report is the examination of the
neural mechanisms underlying modulation of affective
responses by perceived control, we also sought to clarify
these controversies.
METHODS
Participants
Participants were recruited using campus advertisements.
Individuals were excluded if they were left-handed,
pregnant, claustrophobic, or had a current psychiatric or
chronic pain disorder or a history of such disorders. They
were screened for medical conditions that could affect
pain sensitivity or regular use of drugs such as opioids or
NSAIDS that could alter pain perception. As the experimen-
tal manipulation involved deception and was dependent
on participants believing the instructions, psychology
majors were excluded on the grounds that they might have
familiarity with previous manipulations (e.g., learned help-
lessness experiments) in which participants were deceived
about the amount of control they were able to exert. Par-
ticipants signed informed consent and were randomized to
the controllable and uncontrollable groups. Three par-
ticipants were excluded because the post experimental
questionnaire indicated that they had determined the
intent of the experiment. Seven participants were excluded
from the controllable group because they failed to reliably
identify the response pattern to elicit positive visual feed-
back (see Experimental Session section). This yielded a
final sample of 52 participants with 23 in the controllable
group (12 women; M[SD] = 20.8 [2.6] years) and 29 in
the uncontrollable group (14 women; M[SD] = 20.2 [2.1]).
The Health Sciences institutional review board of the
University of Wisconsin-Madison approved the protocol.
Familiarization Session
A separate familiarization session was used to determine the
level of thermal stimulation to be used in the subsequent
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fMRI imaging session. Thermal stimulation was delivered
using a stimulator (TSA-II; www.medoc-web.com) con-
nected to a 30 × 30 mm, MRI-compatible Peltier device
affixed to the dorsal surface of the left forearm. Stimulation
began at 32°C and increased by 0.7°C/sec. Participants were
instructed to terminate stimulation when their pain reached
an 8 on an 11-point numeric rating scale anchored by 0
(no pain) and 10 (worst pain imaginable). This was re-
peated 10 times, with 30-sec breaks between presentations.
The mean temperature from the final five trials defined the
painfully hot stimulus. This strategy for determining a level
of thermal stimulation mirrors the one used in previous
studies of perceived control (Salomons, 2004). The maxi-
mum temperature used in the experiment was not allowed
to exceed 49°C. After titrating the thermal stimulation,
participants were familiarized with the MR environment
using a mock scanner and were given one 10-sec (“long”),
five 5-sec (“medium”) and four 2-sec (“short”) heat stimuli
to ensure that the experimental stimuli were painful but
tolerable.
Thermal stimuli delivered during the experimental
session (see below) were delivered to the dorsal surface
of the left forearm with a ramp speed of 10°C/sec for all
participants.
Experimental Session
On the day of the experimental session, participants were
given a four-button keypad and were instructed that they
would receive a series of short (2 sec), medium (5 sec), and
long (10 sec) pain stimuli in a random, preset order. Each
trial began with a 6-sec visual cue 12 (±3) sec before the
onset of pain. Following onset of the pain stimulus, there
was a 5-sec gap, followed by a 7-sec rating screen and a
20- (±3) sec gap, resulting in a total ISI of 32 (±3) sec.During
the ISI, participants rated pain intensity and unpleasantness
on a 0–10 numeric rating scale (for intensity: 0 = No Pain,
10 = Most Intense Pain Imaginable; for unpleasantness:
0 = Not Unpleasant, 10 = Extremely Unpleasant).
The cue consisted of four stars (three green, one red),
and participants were told that they could shorten the
length of the subsequent painful stimuli by finding the
correct sequence of button presses on the keys cor-
responding to the green stars. They were told that if they
pressed the correct sequence on a trial in which they were
supposed to receive a 10-sec pain stimulus they would
receive a 5-sec stimulus and if they were supposed to re-
ceive a 5-sec stimulus and made the correct response they
would receive a 2-sec stimulus. They were told that 2-sec
stimuli could not be shortened. Participants were in-
structed that, once the correct sequence had been dis-
covered (as indicated by visual feedback), they would be
able to shorten the heat on every subsequent trial by re-
peating that sequence. To ensure that all participants in
the controllable group received identical feedback (and
thus a similar affective experience), participants who did
not identify the correct pattern or who did not persist with
the correct pattern following initial success feedback were
excluded (n = 7).
To prevent the responses from becoming stereotyped
and to maintain a level of interest, the red star appeared
in a different position on each trial. The sequence of button
presses, however, remained the same so that once partic-
ipants identified the correct response sequence they could
use it on all subsequent trials. For example, in Figure 1A,
if the correct sequence was “Left, Middle, Right,” they
would press Buttons 2, 3, and 4. If the red star moved to
Position 2 on a subsequent trial, then they would press
Buttons 1, 3, and 4 to maintain the “Left, Middle, Right”
pattern.
All participants irrespective of their perceived control
group status received an identical sequence of 50 thermal
stimuli (1 long, 25 medium, 24 short). Controllability was
Figure 1. Study design. (A) One single trial. Participants were given a
button box and told that they could shorten the painful stimulation if
they found the correct pattern of presses on the buttons corresponding
to the green stars. (B) 2-, 5- and 10-sec stimuli were presented in the
same proportion and order in both groups. The groups differed only in
the visual feedback received. Participants in the uncontrollable group
received consistent feedback indicating they had failed to exert control
over the length of the heat (indicated in red). After figuring out the
pattern, participants in the controllable group received feedback indicating
that they had successfully controlled the length of the heat (indicated in
green). (C) The analytic focus was the medium (5 sec) stimuli. On the first
five (“matched”) trials, participants received identical painful stimuli and
identical feedback. On the subsequent 20 (“unmatched”) trials, participants
received identical painful stimuli but differed in feedback and therefore
perception of control.
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manipulated as follows: Following their discovery of the
correct button sequence, the Controllable (C) group re-
ceived visual feedback concurrent with the presentation
of the thermal stimuli indicating that they had success-
fully reduced the duration of the thermal stimuli when
they pressed the correct response sequence (or in the
case of 2-sec trials which could not be shortened, feed-
back simply indicated that they had made the correct
response). By contrast, the Uncontrollable (UC) group
always received feedback indicating that they had failed
to make the correct response sequence and thus failed
to control the duration of the heat (see Figure 1B). Thus,
the Controllable and Uncontrollable groups received an
identical set of thermal stimuli but differed in the feed-
back they received indicating whether or not they had
controlled the duration of the thermal stimuli.
To control for potential group differences in pain re-
sponse and response to failure feedback, we ensured that
all participants in the controllable group had the same
number of initial failure trials. This was done as follows: un-
beknownst to participants in the Controllable group, the
“correct” response button sequence was determined by
the first novel response following the 12th trial. This
allowed an initial set of trials (which included five 5-sec
stimuli; see Figure 1C) on which participants in both
groups received identical thermal stimuli and identical
feedback indicating that they had failed to control the
length of the heat. These initial trials in which both groups
received failure feedback are hereafter referred to as
“matched trials.” Subsequent trials in which thermal stimuli
were identical but the feedback provided was different
(contingent on participants in the Controllable group
making the correct response) are referred to as “un-
matched trials” (this set of trials included twenty 5-sec
trials; see Figure 1C). Thus, the 50 total trials included both
an initial set of matched trials and a subsequent set of
unmatched trials. To maintain the illusion that repeating
the correct sequence would always shorten the heat, no
10-sec heat bursts were given following the 12th trial.
There was minimal variation in the number of trials needed
to achieve a first novel and successful button response: all
participants in the controllable group made a novel re-
sponse between the fifth and sixth 5-sec stimuli (cor-
responding to the last 5-sec trial of the matched set and
the first 5-sec trial of the unmatched set).
The analytic focus of the experiment for both ROI and
whole-brain analyses was the medium (5-sec) trials, as par-
ticipants in the Controllable group were led to believe that
they had successfully reduced a long stimulus, whereas
participants in the Uncontrollable group believed they
had failed to reduce the medium stimuli to short ones.
There were fivemedium-length stimuli during thematched
period and 20 medium-length stimuli during the un-
matched period (see Figure 1C). All subsequent analyses
and references to painful stimuli will refer to these 5-sec
medium trials. We use the label “Time” for this variable
to reflect the fact that all matched trials occurred before
the controllable group received feedback that they had
discovered the correct response pattern.
The state anxiety portion of the State–Trait Anxiety
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970)
was administered immediately before and immediately
after the scanning session. The variable created by residua-
lizing scores on the “after” questionnaire with respect to
the “before” questionnaire will hereafter be referred to
as “state anxiety change.” Residualized scores were used
for all difference scores (including RT and pain intensity)
instead of simple difference scores as previous research
(Williams & Zimmerman, 1982) suggests that residualized
scores are more reliable when the ratio of standard devia-
tions of early to late trials is greater than the correlation
between early and late trials, which was found to be the
case in this study for state anxiety. Results did not change
substantively if simple difference scores were used. One
participant in the controllable group did not provide state
anxiety data; thus, analyses of state-related changes in
anxiety are conducted on the 51 remaining participants.
Following testing, participants completed a ques-
tionnaire that assessed their understanding of the task,
motivation, degree of engagement, perceived control, and
attributions for success/failure using a series of structured
and unstructured questions. Each item was administered
on a 5-point Likert scale.
Analyses of all behavioral data and correlations with
extracted neural data (see below) were conducted in SPSS
(Chicago, IL). Group × Time interactions in dependent
measures (state anxiety, neural activation in ROIs) were
analyzed with group (UC vs. C) as a between-subject
factor and time as a repeated-measures factor (pre- vs.
postexperiment for state anxiety and Matched 5-sec trials
vs. Unmatched 5-sec trials for all variables). Between-
group comparisons (e.g., group differences in posttesting
questionnaire data) were conducted using a one-way
ANOVA with group as a factor. Within-group analyses (e.g.,
comparing state-related changes in self-reported anxiety)
were run as repeated-measures ANOVAs. p < .05 (two-
tailed) was used as the a priori significance level for all
analyses.
fMRI Image Acquisition
Images were acquired on a General Electric Signa 3.0-T
high-speed imaging device with a quadrature head coil.
Functional images consisted of 30 × 4 mm sagittal EPI
slices covering the whole brain (1 mm interslice gap;
64 × 64 in-plane resolution; field of view = 240 mm;
repetition time/echo time/flip = 2000 msec/30 msec/90;
225 image volumes per run). Immediately preceding acqui-
sition of functional images, a whole-brain high-resolution
T1-weighted anatomical scan (3-D T1-weighted inversion
recovery fast gradient-echo; 256 × 256 in-plane resolution;
field of view = 240 mm; 124 × 1.2 mm axial slices) was
acquired. Functional images were collected in five scan
runs, 7 min and 30 sec per run.
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fMRI Image Analysis
Data preprocessing consisted of slice time correction and
motion correction using AFNI (Cox, 1996). All other anal-
yses were carried out using FEAT (Beckmann, Jenkinson,
& Smith, 2003; fMRI Expert Analysis Tool), part of FSL
(FMRIBʼs Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Data
were smoothed with a 5-mm FWHM Gaussian blur and
high-pass filtered with a 100-sec cutoff. Five volumes
were dropped at the beginning of the experiment for
signal stabilization.
Data were analyzed in two steps. In the first general
linear model (GLM; at the individual participant level), a
separate regressor for each experimental condition (the
cue, the 3-sec anticipatory period, the rating screen, and
the short, medium, and long pain stimuli, with matched
and unmatched 5-sec medium pain stimuli modeled sep-
arately) was derived by convolving a stimulus-based binary
boxcar function (from onset to offset of the experimental
condition) with an ideal hemodynamic response. Main
effect analyses of controllability were assessed from the
results of this individual participant level GLM.
To examine psychophysical interactions (PPI; Friston
et al., 1997) with our ROIs, the fMRI time series was ex-
tracted from the seed region for each participant, and this
time series was entered as a regressor along with all events
modeled in the experiment. A regressor representing the
interaction of the seed time series with the unmatched
pain regressor was also run to examine which regions of
the brain differed in their connectivity with the seed re-
gion as a function of pain. Additionally, scan runs and six
motion covariates (I-S, L-R, A-P, pitch, yaw, and roll) were
included as nuisance variables. The time series data for
each voxel were then modeled as the linear sum of all re-
gressors. Data were registered to MNI space using FLIRT.
ROI Analysis
The primary goal of ROI analysis was to examine the role
of two a priori ROIs (amygdala and NAcc) in processing
the effects of perceived control on state anxiety change.
In line with this goal, we extracted values from anatomically
defined amygdala and NAcc seeds. ROIs were generated
by creating a mask of these regions from the Harvard
Oxford Subcortical Structural Atlas. Probability maps were
thresholded such that every voxel within the mask had at
least an 80% chance of being within the structure. This
mask was then used to extract values from the appropriate
contrast maps (see below). We first examined the main
effects of perceived control on activation in these regions,
analyzing extracted values by group (UC vs. C) and at sin-
gle time points (Matched vs. Unmatched trials), as well as
Group × Time interactions in SPSS. We were also inter-
ested in patterns of connectivity that underlie state anxiety
change when participants perceived control. We therefore
conducted a voxelwise GLM within the Controllable group
to search for regions where altered connectivity with the
seed regions during pain (the output of the interaction
term in the first GLM) was significantly associated with state
anxiety change.
Contrasts at group and individual level are provided
as z scores. For all neuroimaging analyses, a cluster-wise
correction for multiple comparisons (z = 2.3, p < .05,
Gaussian Random Field Theory) was used, unless other-
wise noted.
Whole-brain Main Effect Analyses of Pain
and Controllability
The neural response to painful stimulation has been well
delineated and has been the subject of both quantitative
(Farrell, Laird, & Egan, 2005) and qualitative (Peyron,
Laurent, & Garcia-Larrea, 2000) meta-analyses. Several
regions, including the anterior cingulate, insula, secondary
somatosensory cortex, and thalamus are consistently acti-
vated when participants are exposed to painful experimen-
tal stimuli (Johnstone, Salomons, Backonja, & Davidson,
2012). As a measure of data quality, we conducted an
analysis to ensure that our findings were concordant with
this literature. Pain-related activations are presented in
Table 1. Figure 5 displays regions that were significantly
activated in both the Controllable and Uncontrollable
group on the twenty “Unmatched” 5-sec stimuli.
For the purpose of comparison with previous studies
of the effects of perceived control on pain (Wiech et al.,
2006; Salomons, 2004), the results of whole-brain analyses
comparing “Unmatched” pain trials between the Uncon-
trollable group to the Controllable group are also reported
(UC > C). Paralleling the analysis method used in our
previous published work (Salomons, 2004), we report
the main effects of perceived control (UC > C) as well as
the stimulus/controllability overlap (regions activated in
both conditions, but more significantly activated in the
uncontrollable condition).
RESULTS
Consistent with expectation, the Controllable group re-
ported greater perceived control than the Uncontrollable
group (M/SD = 3.3/1.3 for C, 1.7/1.2 for UC; F(1, 50) =
20.7, p< .05) on the posttesting questionnaire. The groups
did not differ in the degree to which they found the task
boring (M/SD = 2.5/0.8 for C; 2.2/1.0 for UC) or their
self-reported level of motivation following the experiment
(M/SD = 4.7/0.6 for C, 4.3/0.9 for UC).
A repeated-measures ANOVA indicated a significant
Group × Time interaction in state anxiety, F(1, 49) =
14.2, p < .05. Consistent with our hypothesis that expo-
sure to uncontrollable stress would elicit anxiety, the
uncontrollable group reported more anxiety following the
experiment (preM/SD 31.48/5.02, post 34.62/7.15; paired
t(1, 28) = 2.76, p < .05), whereas the controllable group
reported less anxiety (preM/SD 33.14/6.35, post 29.09/4.39;
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paired t(1, 21) =−2.53, p< .05). There was no significant
group difference onpre-experiment state anxiety,F(1, 49)=
1.08, p = .30, but the post-experiment difference was
significant, F(1, 49) = 10.26, p < .05.
There was a significant Group × Time interaction in self-
reported pain intensity ratings, F(1, 50) = 5.02, p = .03,
such that the Controllable group experienced a more
pronounced increase in pain (mean/SD matched trials =
4.93/1.15, unmatched trials 6.23/1.54, t = 6.28, p < .01)
than the Uncontrollable group (mean/SD matched trials =
4.79/1.39, unmatched trials 5.49/1.41, t = 4.09, p < .01).
There was also a trend toward a significant difference be-
tween groups in pain intensity ratings on unmatched trials
(F = 3.19, p = .08). There was no relationship between
Table 1. Activation Results
A
Region xyz Z-score Max Voxel
Medial frontal gyrus (BA 9/BA 10) “mPFC” 0, 60, 8 5.15
Posterior cingulate gyrus (BA 23) 0, −54, 24 3.98
Superior/middle frontal gyrus (BA 8) “dlPFC” −22, 32, 32 3.66
Anterior cingulate gyrus (BA 24) “ACC” 0, −12, 36 4.37
Cuneus (BA 19) 20, −82, 38 3.27
Lingual gyrus 22, −62, −4 3.59
−12, −56, −2 3.87
Lingual/parahippocampal gyrus 28, −40, −8 3.02
Fusiform gyrus (BA 37) 42, −48, −16 3.71
Superior temporal gyrus 56, −22, 0 2.86
Thalamus −20, −32, 0 2.65
Hippocampus 28, −20, −18 5.15
B
Region xyz Mean Z-statistic
Anterior cingulate gyrus (BA 32)/SMA (BA 6) 2, 14, 38 7.08
Insular cortex (BA 13) 36, 8, 6 10.13
40, −14, 14 9.77
−36, 4, 6 8.31
Thalamus 8, −12, 0 6.85
−10, −12, 2 4.3
Inferior parietal lobe (BA 40) 62, −20, 20 8.66
Middle frontal gyrus (BA 9/BA 6) 44, 8, 36 5.76
Middle frontal gyrus (BA 46) 42, 40, 16 6.24
Inferior frontal gyrus (BA 10) 42, 44, 4 6.33
Fusiform gyrus 26, −78, −12 8.46
−18, −82, −16 8.90
Putamen 22, 10, −4 4.87
Lingual gyrus 4, −88, 0 8.5
(A) Significant activations in group contrast (UC–C). Regions surviving the cluster-based correction for multiple comparisons in the group contrast
(uncontrollable > controllable). Coordinates are in MNI space. (B) Activation in pain-related regions. To examine consistent responses to painful
stimuli, we broke the twenty-five 5-sec stimuli into five sets. The following regions were significant in all five sets and also during presentation of
10-sec stimuli following the experiment (which was presented without visual stimuli to mask out regions associated with viewing feedback stimuli).
Mean Z-statistics represent the mean of activation in all those conditions.
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pain intensity and state anxiety (r = −.09, p = .54). There
was no Group × Time interaction in pain unpleasantness
ratings, F(1, 50) = 0.67, p = .42.
There was a significant Group × Time interaction in
RT, F(1, 50) = 64.6, p< .01. Compared with the matched
trials, the Uncontrollable groupʼs RT on the unmatched
trials increased and the Controllable groupʼs RT de-
creased (Controllable group mean/SD in milliseconds
preexperiment = 2808.57/480.79, postexperiment
2023.54/314.33; Uncontrollable group mean/SD in milli-
seconds preexperiment 2603.94/728.53, postexperiment
2757.29/660.77). There was no significant group differ-
ence in RT on the matched trials, F(1, 50) = 1.35, p =
.25. RTs may be understood as an indirect proxy for task
engagement, as longer RTs in the Uncontrollable group
likely reflect ongoing uncertainty about the response
required to shorten the nociceptive stimulus in the wake
of negative feedback. RT change negatively correlated
with pain intensity ratings (r = −.34, p = .02) and self-
reported perceived control (r = −.42, p < .01). These
findings indicate that engagement in the task appeared
to result in reduction of perceived pain intensity.
ROI Analyses: Neural Circuits Underlying
Anxiolytic Effects of Controllability
A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant
Group × Time interaction for bilateral amygdala, F(1,
50) = 4.02, p = .05. Follow-up tests demonstrated sig-
nificantly more activation in the uncontrollable group in
the amygdala on unmatched trials, F(1, 50) = 5.88, p <
.05 (see Figure 2A). There was no difference in amygdala
activation between the groups onmatched trials, F(1, 50)=
0.59, p = .45. Within the Controllable group, amygdala
activation was significantly correlated with state anxiety
such that reduction in amygdala activation (unmatched
trials residualized with respect to matched trials) was asso-
ciated with reduced state anxiety (posttesting STAI resid-
ualized with respect to pretesting STAI; r = .56, p < .05;
see Figure 4).
A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant
Group × Time interaction for the bilateral NAcc, F(1, 50) =
5.95, p< .05 (see Figure 2B). There was significantly more
NAcc activation in the controllable group on unmatched
trials, F(1, 50) = 5.95, p < .05. There was no difference
between the groups on matched trials, F(1, 50) = −0.85,
p = .36. NAcc activation was correlated with state anxiety
change within the Controllable group (r= .6, p< .05) such
that higher NAcc activation was associated with higher
state anxiety. This correlation was not significant after
accounting for a single outlier >2SD from the mean in
state anxiety change and will therefore not be discussed
further. Accounting for this outlier (as well as one similar
outlier in the UC group) did not affect the significance or
direction of any of the other results in this report.
A PPI analysis was conducted to look for regions where
altered connectivity with amygdala and NAcc during pain
predicted state anxiety change in the Controllable group.
Increased functional connectivity between bilateral NAcc
and several prefrontal regions was significantly associated
with reduced state anxiety. These regions included the
ventral medial pFC (BA 10/BA 32) and bilateral ventral
lateral prefrontal/orbitofrontal cortex (BA 11/BA 44/BA 45/
BA 47).
Increased functional connectivity between bilateral
amygdala and right ventral lateral prefrontal/orbitofrontal
cortex (BA 11/BA 44/BA 45/BA 47; peak 48, 34, −10; see
Figure 3A) was significantly associated with reduced state
anxiety. This ventral lateral prefrontal/orbitofrontal cortex
region (hereby “vlPFC“) largely overlapped with the cor-
responding pFC cluster in the NAcc map. The correlation
between state anxiety reduction and connectivity between
this overlapping vlPFC cluster and the amygdala (r=−.69)
was significantly stronger than the corresponding correla-
tion in the Uncontrollable group (UC r = −.33, p = ns;
z for difference between correlations = −1.67, p < .05).
Similarly, the association between state anxiety change
and NAcc–vlPFC connectivity (r = −.74) was significantly
stronger than in the Uncontrollable group (UC r = .03,
p = ns; z for difference between correlations = −3.25,
p< .05). Although these findings suggest that the relation-
ship between anxiety and pFC to amygdala and anxiety and
pFC to NAcc connectivity might be unique to controllable
stress, they should be interpreted with caution. Specifically,
the connected regions were derived from a voxel-wise
search within the controllable group and thus may result
Figure 2. Group × Time interaction for amygdala (A) and NAcc (B)
activation. The Group × Time interaction was significant for anatomically
defined clusters in both amygdala, F(1, 50) = 4.02, p = .05, and NAcc,
F(1, 50) = 5.95, p < .05. Groups did not differ on matched trials for
either region.
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in a bias toward that group. There was no group difference
in the mean level of connectivity between the amygdala
and vlPFC, F(1, 50) = 0.03, p = .87, or between NAcc
and vlPFC, F(1, 50) = 0.01, p = .94.
Although connectivity between amygdala and vmPFC
did not meet our a priori threshold for significance
(z = 2.3, p < .05 corrected), given the demonstrated
involvement of vmPFC in mediating the beneficial effects
of perceived control and, more generally, in interacting
with amygdala to regulate negative affect (Urry et al.,
2006), we were interested in investigating the role of this
region. We reran the analysis at a reduced voxelwise
threshold while still applying correction for multiple
comparisons (z = 1.96, p < .05, corrected). At this level,
connectivity between amygdala and both vmPFC and left
vlPFC was significantly associated with state anxiety
change. This map largely overlapped the NAcc connec-
tivity mask (see Figure 3B for overlap). Increased connec-
tivity between vmPFC and amygdala was correlated with
state anxiety reduction in the Controllable group (r=−.7).
This relationship was nonsignificant in the Uncontrollable
group (r = −.14, p = .49) and significantly weaker than
the Controllable group (z = −2.41, p < .05). Similarly,
increased vmPFC–NAcc connectivity was associated with
state anxiety reduction in the Controllable (r = −.7) but
not Uncontrollable group (r= .17, p= .37). This difference
was significant (z=−3.44, p< .05). Although the focus of
this report is the right vlPFC region that met our a priori
threshold in both maps, these results nevertheless indicate
that functional connectivity between the two seed regions
and ventral lateral pFC is bilateral. Furthermore, they
confirm the role of vmPFC in the anxiolytic effects of
perceived control.
Whole-brain Analyses: Effects of Perceived Control
The Uncontrollable group displayed significantly more
activation during the pain stimuli on the unmatched trials,
compared with the Controllable group, in a number of
regions (Table 1). These included regions such as the thala-
mus, insula, and anterior cingulate that are commonly acti-
vated in pain, reinforcing our previous finding (Salomons,
2004) that perceived control reduces activation within re-
gions commonly associated with pain when control is per-
ceived. We also observed activation differences (UC > C)
in posterior cingulate cortex as well as a region of parietal
cortex (BA7) that has been linked with the integration
Figure 4. Amygdala activation versus state anxiety change in the
controllable group. Postscan state anxiety is residualized with respect to
prescan anxiety. Amygdala activation on unmatched trials is residualized
with respect to activation on matched trials.
Figure 3. (A) Functional connectivity of vlPFC with amygdala and
NAcc predicts state anxiety change. Anatomically defined amygdala
and NAcc clusters were used as seeds in PPI analysis. Maps of regions
whose connectivity with the ROI was associated with reduced anxiety
were generated. The region of vlPFC pictured represents the overlap of
the amygdala and NAcc map, such that increased functional connectivity
of vlPFC with both regions (indicated by the green arrow) significantly
predicted reduced anxiety (r = −.67 for amygdala, r = −.74 for NAcc).
z = 2.3 ( p < .05, corrected). (B) Extended map of amygdala and
NAcc connectivity overlap. To investigate an a priori hypothesis about
involvement of vmPFC, we examined regions where increased connectivity
of both amygdala and NAcc predicted reduced state anxiety change at a
lower threshold of z = 1.96 ( p < .05, corrected). Images are shown at
the peak voxel (z = 4.0) for vmPFC.
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of visual and somatosensory input in threat assessment
(Dong, Chudler, Sugiyama, Roberts, & Hayashi, 1994;
Robinson & Burton, 1980). There were no activation dif-
ferences (C > UC) that survived correction for multiple
comparisons at the whole-brain level (see Figure 5).
Correlations between Activation and
Behavioral Measures
Increased activation in mPFC was also associated with
longer RT (r = .34, p = .01). Within the uncontrollable
group, higher activation in mPFC was associated with
increased anxiety (r = .4, p = .04).
DISCUSSION
These data provide evidence for the anxiolytic effects of
perceived control over a stressor. Participants who per-
ceived control over pain experienced a significant reduc-
tion in state anxiety compared with participants who did
not. Participants who perceived control also had reduced
activation in the amygdala and increased activation in NAcc.
Inparticipantswhoperceived control, these anxiolytic effects
were associated with increased functional connectivity of
amygdala and NAcc with both vlPFC and vmPFC.
The amygdalaʼs involvement in the encoding of affec-
tive significance and in emotional learning and expression
is well documented (Morrison & Salzman, 2010; Phelps
& LeDoux, 2005; Davis & Whalen, 2001). Of particular
relevance to the present findings are data linking dysregu-
lated amygdalar activation with anxiety disorders (Shin &
Liberzon, 2010; Bishop, 2007) and behavioral inhibition
(Oler et al., 2010). Animal and human work has focused
on the role of prefrontal regions in regulating amygdala re-
sponses and the lack of a regulatory relationship between
pFC and amygdala has been observed in major depressive
disorder ( Johnstone et al., 2007). Consistent with this
literature, studies in which participants are asked to re-
appraise aversive stimuli consistently observe a regulatory
relationship between prefrontal regions and the amygdala
(Ochsner & Gross, 2005), with the vlPFC most frequently
implicated (Goldin et al., 2008; Johnstone et al., 2007;
Ochsner et al., 2002; Schaefer et al., 2002). Consistent with
the role of amygdala in negative affect, we observed re-
duced activation in amygdala when individuals perceived
control and a positive relationship between amygdala
activation and state anxiety change. The amygdala has also
been demonstrated to underlie reappraisal of both pain
and other elicitors of negative affect within individuals
(Lapate et al., 2012). Our finding that increased connec-
tivity of amygdala and vlPFC was associated with reduced
anxiety when participants perceived control is consistent
with previous observations linking interactions between
these regions in regulating negative affect.
In addition to the previously observed role of vlPFC–
amygdala interactions, it has been hypothesized that stria-
tal regions play a role in processing affective responses
to choice and perceived control (Leotti et al., 2010). Fur-
thermore, Wager et al. (2008) suggested a role for one
particular region of the striatum, the NAcc, in cognitive
regulation of negative affect, with vlPFC up-regulating the
NAcc during reappraisal of negative affect. This region is
frequently associated with reward processing and reward-
related affect (Haber & Knutson, 2010), leading to the
hypothesis that its role in volitional control of negative
emotion is increasing positive affect in parallel with
amygdala-related reduction of negative affect (Wager
et al., 2008). Our finding that perceived control was associ-
ated with increased activation of NAcc and that connectivity
between NAcc and right vlPFC was associated with de-
creased state anxiety in participants who perceived control
is consistent with evidence that perceived control is in-
herently rewarding and motivational (Leotti & Delgado,
2011). These rewarding properties may therefore con-
tribute to the anxiolytic effects of control. Although per-
ceiving a sense of control over oneʼs environment might
be inherently rewarding, it should be noted that the cur-
rent study design does not allow the effects of perceived
control and reward to be disentangled, as perceived con-
trol was delivered in the form of success feedback, which
was likely perceived as rewarding.
There was a high degree of overlap in regions of the pFC
showing anxiety-related functional connectivity changes
with the amygdala and NAcc. In particular, increased
connectivity between the amygdala and the NAcc and
both the vlPFC and vmPFC was associated with reduced
Figure 5. Activation associated with nociceptive stimulation,
controllability, and their overlap. Activations in yellow are regions that
were activated by the 5-sec nociceptive stimuli in both Uncontrollable
and Controllable groups. Activations in blue are regions where
uncontrollable pain elicited significantly more activation in the
Uncontrollable group. Regions in green were significantly activated in
both conditions, but significantly more active in the Uncontrollable
condition.
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anxiety. This is consistent with a large body of literature
documenting the role of these prefrontal regions in pro-
cessing the effects of perceived control and in emotion
regulation more generally. The vmPFC has been demon-
strated to play a role in distinguishing between uncontrol-
lable and controllable stress and mediating the anxiolytic
effects of the latter. Furthermore, covariation between
vmPFC and amygdala has been associated with extinction
of fear (Delgado, Nearing, Ledoux, & Phelps, 2008; Quirk &
Beer, 2006; Urry et al., 2006), although rodent studies
strongly suggest that the role of vmPFC in the anxiolytic
effects of perceived control is an expression of fear rather
than altered learning (Baratta, Lucero, Amat, Watkins, &
Maier, 2008). Furthermore, similar effects are observed if
vmPFC is activated during the expression of fear even in
the absence of perceived control. Collectively, these find-
ings suggest that the anxiolytic effects of perceived control
are not mediated by a dedicated neural circuit but utilize a
more general regulatory mechanism.
Consistent with this assertion, a striking finding of this
study is how similar the neural mechanisms of the anxi-
olytic effects of perceived control are to those observed
in previously published reports of reappraisal of nega-
tive emotion. More specifically, we found that functional
connectivity of both amygdala and NAcc with vlPFC, a
circuit implicated in the reduction of negative affect by
reappraisal (Wager et al., 2008) and compassion training
(Weng et al., 2013), was associated with reductions in
state anxiety when participants had perceived behavioral
control over the duration of the pain stimuli, but no such
relationship existed for participants who did not perceive
control. Averill (1973) has distinguished between behav-
ioral control (where individuals perceive the availability
of a behavioral response, which will remove or modify
a stressor) and cognitive control (where individuals alter
their evaluation of a stressor to reduce their stress re-
sponse). Optimal coping with stress is thought to involve
both forms of control, with cognitive control hypothe-
sized to be an adaptive response when no behavioral
options for controlling stress are available (Carver, Scheier,
& Weintraub, 1989). These data put this assertion in new
light by suggesting that optimal regulation of negative
affect depends on the ability to find a situationally appro-
priate means of activating a common regulatory circuit.
Pain Perception and the Effect of Controllability
Anxiety has commonly been found to exacerbate the ex-
perience of pain (Keefe et al., 2004). The finding that the
Uncontrollable group reported a significantly smaller
increase in pain, despite increased anxiety is therefore
somewhat counterintuitive. In instances of extreme anxi-
ety, stress-induced analgesia has been observed (Amit &
Galina, 1986), but given the relatively low levels of anxiety
elicited and the fact that anxiety and pain intensity were
uncorrelated, it would seem unlikely that the observed
result is because of stress-induced analgesia.
A more likely explanation for this finding is that, on
the unmatched trials (following the Controllable group
finding the correct pattern), the Uncontrollable group
was more engaged in the cognitive task of identifying
the correct pattern of button presses and therefore more
distracted from the pain stimulus than the Controllable
group. Higher engagement throughout the task in the
Uncontrollable group is supported by significantly longer
RTs on the unmatched trials in that group. Longer RTs
indicate a combination of continued effort and uncer-
tainty, as participants who had either figured out the cor-
rect pattern or given up serious efforts to figure out the
pattern would be expected to respond more quickly.
Given that feedback about the correctness of the response
was coincident with the pain stimuli, it is likely that par-
ticipants who remained engaged in the task would be
actively evaluating their previous responses and perhaps
formulating future responses during the pain stimuli, a
process that likely distracted from the coincident sensory
input. The possibility that this process might have dis-
tracted participants from the sensory aspects of the pain
stimuli is consistent with the observed correlation be-
tween RT and pain intensity ratings, such that slower RTs
(indicative of greater task engagement) were associated
with decreased pain ratings.
An attentional interpretation of this finding is also consis-
tent with the fact that differences were observed between
the groups in intensity, rather than unpleasantness. Two
studies examining the differential impact of emotion and
attentiononpain (Villemure&Bushnell, 2002, 2009) report
that emotional modulation of pain differentially affects pain
unpleasantness whereas attentional modulation affects
pain intensity.
This interpretation casts new light on previous findings
regarding the effects of perceived control on pain percep-
tion and neural activation. A previous within-participants
study found widespread increases throughout the so-called
“pain matrix” when pain was perceived as uncontrollable,
although these activation increases were not associated
with increased pain perception (Salomons, 2004). This
2004 study diverged from a subsequent study by Wiech
et al. (2006), which found increased activation in regions
such as ACC in the controllable (rather than uncontrol-
lable) condition, as well as reduced pain perception in
the controllable condition. These divergent findings
can be reconciled using more recent work, suggesting
that activation within the “pain matrix” is largely unspecific
for pain and rather has to do with the salience of the
stimulus—the degree to which the stimulus captures atten-
tion and/or compels action.
In the experiment by Wiech and colleagues (Iannetti,
Salomons, Moayedi, Mouraux, & Davis, 2013), participants
were asked to stop the stimuli in the controllable con-
dition when they could no longer tolerate the pain, likely
drawing their attention toward the pain in that condition
and increasing pain perception. In this case, behavioral
demands of the task likely drew attention to the pain
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stimulus in the controllable condition. In the 2004 study by
Salomons et al., behavioral demands of the task were
matched, but a cue preceding the pain drew participant
attention toward the fact that the subsequent stimulus
would be uncontrollable, likely increasing the salience of
the stimulus in that condition. The current study partially
replicates this latter finding, showing increased activation
in “pain matrix” regions (anterior cingulate and insula),
but these activations are notably less widespread than in
the 2004 study. Within the context of the work on salience
discussed above, a likely explanation is that, although
overall the uncontrollable conditionmight have beenmore
behaviorally demanding (as evidenced by longer RTs) and
therefore more salient overall, these behavioral demands
competed with sensory input for attention, reducing acti-
vation in this “salience” network and resulting in the rela-
tively small net increase in salience regions. This draws
fresh attention to an often-overlooked aspect of the per-
ceived controllability literature, namely the demands that
are placed on an individual seeking to regain control. These
data suggest that it is not only the cognitive state of having
control that is relevant to pain perception and correspond-
ing brain activation but also the behavioral demands of
regaining control that may be of relevance. Future work
should focus on examining how the interaction of per-
ceived control and task difficulty (or the degree to which
the task draws attention away from sensory input) affects
pain perception and associated neural activation.
Conclusion
In summary, we found that when participants perceived
that they had successfully exerted control over a series
of painful stimuli, they experienced reductions in state
anxiety and amygdala activation and increased activation
in the NAcc. In participants who perceived control over
the painful stimuli, increased functional connectivity be-
tween each of these subcortical regions and both ven-
tral lateral and ventral medial pFC was associated with
decreased state anxiety. On the basis of the observed sim-
ilarity between this anxiolytic circuitry and findings of
previous studies of negative affect reduction through
reappraisal, it is suggested that perceived control reduces
anxiety by recruiting a general emotion regulation circuit.
Additionally, our finding partially replicate previous
findings of increased activation in salience regions (e.g.,
ACC, insula) when pain is uncontrollable. Although both
groups experienced an increase in pain intensity as the ex-
periment continued, this increase was significantly smaller
in the Uncontrollable group. As pain intensity was unre-
lated to anxiety, it is likely that this difference was the re-
sult of distraction because of higher task engagement in
the Uncontrollable group, calling attention to the impor-
tance of examining task demands in perceived control
experiments before attributing activation solely to agency
beliefs.
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